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I. INTRODUCTION
A well-known adage states that crime does not pay.  Courts
have long been enforcing this rule.  As far back as 1889, the high
court of New York held, “no one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong . . . These maxims
are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law
administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been su-
perseded by statutes.”1  Codifying this common law tenet, New York
passed the nation’s first anti-notoriety law in 1977, New York Execu-
tive Law Section 632-a, commonly known as the Son of Sam law.
Responding to the profit potential created by the fame of a notori-
ous serial killer, New York tried to create a disincentive to engage in
contracts for the sale of crime stories.  The law operated to enhance
existing tort law available to victims of crimes.  Under the law, once
profits from the sale of a story were identified, the tort statute of
limitations would reopen, giving the victim another opportunity to
sue for a judgment to be satisfied from the newly found profits.
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While the initial Son of Sam law came up against a Supreme
Court challenge and ultimately was held unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds,2 similar laws were adopted by states across
the nation.  Following New York’s lead, the federal government3
and forty-seven states adopted laws designed to prohibit criminals
from profiting from the sale of their stories.4  These laws have been
repeatedly heralded as necessary and moral, justified by the dual
public interests of avoiding the glorification of crime and facilitat-
ing victim’s compensation.5  Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
holding that New York’s law unconstitutionally targeted the First
Amendment rights of the convicted person, the federal govern-
ment6 and many states still have laws on the books that explicitly
outlaw the sale of crime stories.7  However, after the ruling, a num-
ber of states, starting with New York in 1992,8 amended their laws so
that the extended tort recovery could be sought not only from
storytelling profits but also from other profits of the crime.9
In 2001, New York amended its law again.  An additional provi-
sion was added to the law that drastically altered its scope.  The new
provision allows victims of certain crimes to sue the perpetrators in
tort for as long as the perpetrator is under the watch of the criminal
2. Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 502
U.S. 105 (1991).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (2003).
4. Every state except New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Vermont passed
some form of antiprofit law. See list of statutes infra note 128.
5. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 § 9101 (2001) (finding that it is against public
policy to let criminals profit from the sale of their stories); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 7.68.300 (2002) (finding a compelling state interest in compensating the victims of
crime and in preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes. RCW 7.68.310
through 7.68.340 are intended to advance both of these interests).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a) (permitting the court to order a convicted person to “for-
feit all or any part of proceeds received or to be received by that defendant, or a trans-
feree of that defendant, from a contract relating to a depiction of such crime in a
movie, book, newspaper, magazine, radio or television production, or live entertain-
ment of any kind, or an expression of that defendant’s thoughts opinions, or emotions
regarding such crime”).
7. After Simon & Schuster, a number of states followed New York’s lead by amend-
ing their laws to cover proceeds of the crime, thereby curing the constitutional defect.
However, a number of states still have laws that directly target speech, and are therefore
probably still unconstitutional. See list infra note 128.
8. N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney 1992).
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justice system.10  Unlike the existing provision that only allowed re-
covery from the profits of the crime, this new provision permits re-
covery from any and all of a convicted person’s assets.  With the
addition of this provision, New York’s Son of Sam law is now far
more severe than the laws of other states.  It is also inconsistent with
other New York laws and its own original rationales.
This addition to the law unfairly and irrationally targets
tortfeasors in the criminal justice system for a harsh civil penalty not
faced by other tortfeasors.  Under this new provision of the law, a
criminal tortfeasor faces the threat of tort liability far longer than a
non-criminal tortfeasor. Regardless of the nature of the tort or the
extent of monetary damages, criminal tortfeasors have liability
hanging over their heads for years, potentially decades or a lifetime,
whereas the average tortfeasor faces the threat of civil liability for
one or two years.  In addition, the law provides a major deterrent to
amassing assets, and therefore contributing meaningfully to society
in many instances.  Particularly insidious, the law was passed specifi-
cally to facilitate recovery from civil rights settlements won by pris-
oners while incarcerated.  This law will significantly deter prisoners
from bringing lawsuits to vindicate their rights for abuses they suf-
fer while in prison, often at the hands of the state.  Equally worri-
some, the law provides perverse incentives for prison authorities
since the direct result of a violation of an inmate’s rights will be the
compensation of the prisoner’s victim under this law.  This law is
unfair and unnecessary to achieve the State’s legitimate interest in
making sure that victims are compensated for their losses.  The end
result is a less effective and balanced law since the 2001 additions.
This paper will show that, at very least, the State should return
to the 1992 version of the Son of Sam law.  The amended Son of
Sam law is out of step with the laws of other states as well as the rest
of New York’s victim compensation scheme.  It raises a host of ethi-
cal questions by specifically targeting prisoners, and distances itself
from its original rationale through the vast expansion of the law.
10. See Act of June 25, 2001, ch. 62, 2001 McKinney’s Sess. Laws of N.Y. 224 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2001-2002).  The law targets the funds of people in prison, on parole, and
on probation.  There are a number of crimes for which people in New York can be
sentenced to lifetime probation.  This means that there is a class of people for whom
this law creates a never-ending threat of suit. See discussion of the policy problems this
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The amendment has put the entire law in jeopardy of renewed con-
stitutional challenge.  While much has been written about the First
Amendment implications of New York’s Son of Sam law, little atten-
tion has been given to the other constitutional and policy problems
raised by the statute.  It is these other significant defects of the law
that this paper will highlight.  To date there is no published legal
scholarship addressing the recent amendment and its effects.  This
paper identifies particular areas where the law is vulnerable to at-
tack so that advocates concerned with the impact of the law can
investigate these issues further.
Section II of this paper will discuss the history of the New York
law.  Starting with the law’s origination in 1977, it will map the
course of the law through the successful constitutional challenge.
This history will help to provide the context for the forces shaping
the current law.  It is also important to note the drastic ways in
which the current law varies from the earlier incarnations of the
law, both in its substantive effect and in motivating theory.  Section
III will outline the law as it was revised in 1992 and then describe
the 2001 amendment.  This section will also consider legal chal-
lenges that have been brought against the amended New York law
and the likelihood of their success in the courts.  Section IV sug-
gests a number of critiques of the current Son of Sam law.  First, it
looks at how the law compares to similar laws in other states.  This
fifty state survey reveals that the 2001 amendment significantly de-
parts from the model the original law created.  No other state is as
aggressive in its attack on prisoners’ rights, signifying that the New
York law is unnecessarily harsh.  This section will also consider the
current law within the context of the larger workings of New York’s
victim compensation and civil liability schemes.  Section IV will end
with a consideration of the ways in which the expansion of recovery
under the 2001 law raises particularly important legal and policy
concerns.  The paper concludes with a summation of the legal and
policy problems posed by the law, and suggests that advocacy efforts
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II. THE HISTORY
A. 1977: The Son of Sam Law is Born
In 1976 and 1977, David Berkowitz terrorized New York City
with a string of violent and random attacks that left six people dead
and seven others injured.11  As the murders went unsolved,
Berkowitz gained notoriety through a series of letters he left for the
police and the media, signed with the pseudonym “The Son of
Sam.”12  After his capture, Berkowitz attempted to capitalize on his
fame by selling the story of his crimes to a publishing house for
$75,000.13  Outraged and galvanized at the prospect of Berkowitz
profiting by this act, New York passed Executive Law § 632-a, which
has come to be known as the Son of Sam law, to prevent criminals
from profiting from the commercial sale of their crime stories.14
The oft-quoted sentiment from the sponsor of the original bill ex-
presses the motivation behind the law: “It is abhorrent to one’s
sense of justice and decency that an individual . . . can expect to
receive large sums of money for his story once he is captured –
while five people are dead, [and] other people were injured as a
result of his conduct.”15  The first anti-notoriety law of its kind, New
York’s Son of Sam law quickly became a model for other states and
the federal government.  Eventually forty-seven states and the fed-
eral government adopted similar laws.16
The original version of the Son of Sam law required any entity
contracting with an accused or convicted person for the details of
his or her story to submit a copy of the contract and deposit the
proceeds due under the contract to the Crime Victim’s Board.17
11. David Berkowitz Called Incapable Of Standing Trial; 2 Doctors Call Berkowitz
Incapable of Standing Trial, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1977, at A1.
12. Id.
13. Steven P. Vargas, New York’s Son of Sam Law: Alive and Well Today, 11 TOURO L.
REV. 629, 632 (1995).
14. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982). In the end, the law was never ap-
plied to David Berkowitz because he was found unfit to stand trial. Adam Robert
Tschorn, Beyond Son of Sam: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board,
and a Constitutionally Valid Alternative to New York Executive Law Section 632-A, 17 VT. L.
REV. 321, 325 (1992).
15. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109 (quoting Memorandum of Sen. Emanuel R.
Gold, reprinted in New York State Legislative Annual, 1977, at 267).
16. See infra note 126-28.
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The money in the account was then made available to the victims of
the crime as long as the victim brought a civil action within five
years of the establishment of the escrow account.18  The law applied
to any person convicted of a crime after a trial or a guilty plea and
to “any person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the
commission of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted.”19
In other words, the law provided a different set of rules for tort
actions against criminals who attempted to sell their stories.  Where
a criminal made money from the sale of the crime story, the expira-
tion of the traditional tort statute of limitations did not bar suit.
Instead, the Son of Sam law provided for an extended period of
limitations (five years from the establishment of the escrow ac-
count) during which a victim could bring a tort action to win a
judgment to be collected from the profits from the story.
The original version of the law was only applied ten times.20
Soon after its passage, New York’s Son of Sam law came under con-
stitutional attack.21  Eventually, one challenge made its way to the
Supreme Court.
B. The Son of Sam Law & The Supreme Court
In 1981, Henry Hill, protected by the anonymity of the witness
protection program, contracted with Simon & Schuster for the
right to publish his book, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, detailing
his exploits as a successful gangster.22  The book was published and
garnered both critical acclaim and popular success, culminating in
the adaptation of the story into the Academy Award winning film
Goodfellas.23  Once the book was published, however, the Crime Vic-
tim’s Board took action.  After reviewing the book, the Board
deemed it fell within the purview of New York’s Executive Law Sec-
18. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(ii) (McKinney 1982).
19. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982).
20. Andrew Michael Lauri & Patricia M. Schaubeck, Like Father Like Son? The Con-
stitutionality of New York’s Son of Sam Law, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 279, 282
(1992).
21. There were four constitutional challenges made to the original law. See Simon
& Schuster, 502 U.S. 105; Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromolis, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453
(1991); Matter of Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Barrett v. Wotjowicz,
404 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dept. 1979).
22. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 112.
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tion 632-a.24  The Board ordered Hill to turn over all the money he
had already received under the contract and ordered Simon &
Schuster to turn over all future funds payable to Hill.  In Simon &
Schuster v. Members of The New York State Crime Victim’s Board,25 Simon
& Schuster challenged New York’s Son of Sam law on First Amend-
ment grounds.  The Court explained that the case was particularly
noteworthy at the time.  “Because the Federal Government and
most of the States have enacted statutes with similar objectives, the
issue is significant and likely to recur.”26
First the Court acknowledged that the Son of Sam law was a
content-based regulation of speech and therefore presumptively in-
consistent with the First Amendment.27  As the Court explained,
“[i]t singles out income derived from expressive activity for a bur-
den the State places on no other income, and it is directed only at
works with a specific content.”28  In order for such a regulation to
be legitimate, “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.”29  The Court unanimously held that the law failed this
strict scrutiny review.30
The Court held that the State had a compelling interest in
compensating victims and in ensuring that criminals do not profit
from their crimes.31  However, it concluded that limiting compensa-
tion to profits only from storytelling was not necessary to achieve
these compelling interests.32  The Court explained, “[t]he distinc-
tion drawn by the Son of Sam law [between funds from speech and
other profits of crime] has nothing to do with the State’s interest in
transferring the proceeds of crime from criminals to their
victims.”33
24. Id.
25. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
26. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 116.
29. Id. at 118 (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
30. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123.
31. Id. at 118 - 19.
32. Id.
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The Court also held that the law was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the State’s compelling interests of victim compensation and
preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes.34  The stat-
ute’s broad definition of “persons convicted of a crime” allowed the
State to target people who admitted to crimes of which they had
not been convicted.35  The Court found that this broad definition
rendered the law overly inclusive.36  The Court concluded:
[I]n the Son of Sam law, New York has singled out speech
on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places
on no other speech and no other income. The State’s in-
terest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime is a
compelling one, but the Son of Sam law in not narrowly
tailored to advance that objective. As a result, the statute
is inconsistent with the First Amendment.37
After this ruling, New York repealed its law.38
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. 1992: New York Tries Again
After the Supreme Court struck down the original Son of Sam
law, New York attempted to pass a new version of the law that
avoided the constitutional pitfalls of the first.  Finding that the Su-
preme Court ruling “has deprived crime victims and their personal
representatives of a useful means by which to seek recompense
from the criminal responsible for their victimization,”39 the State
passed a new set of bills that provided even more protections for
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Court stated, “[s]hould a prominent figure write his autobiography at the
end of his career, and include in an early chapter a brief recollection of having stolen
(in New York) a nearly worthless item as a youthful prank, the Board would control his
entire income from the book for five years, and would make that income available to all
of the author’s creditors, despite the fact that the statute of limitations for this minor
incident had long since run.  That the Son of Sam law can produce such an outcome
indicates that the statute is, to say the least, not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s
objective of compensating crime victims from the profits of crime.” Id. at 123.
37. Id.
38. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a, repealed by L. 1992, c. 618, § 10, eff. July 24, 1992.
39. Memorandum of Senator Emmanuel Gold, Governor’s Bill Jacket to L. 1992,
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the rights of victims.40  As the legislative history describes, “[t]his
bill . . . attempts to recapture for crime victims much of what was
intended for them under ‘Son of Sam.’  In many ways, it accom-
plishes much more.”41  In combination with a number of provisions
liberalizing the civil and restitutional compensation laws,42 the
State passed a revised Son of Sam law as part of its wider attempt to
provide for greater victim compensation.43
Like its predecessor, the 1992 version of the Son of Sam law
primarily altered the tort statute of limitations; the law provided for
an extension of the time within which a victim could bring a tort
action against a convicted person. While the structure of the law
remained the same, the law made a number of alterations to the
original Son of Sam law framework.44  The legislative history of the
bill identifies three changes implemented in the 1992 law that rem-
edied the problems of the prior statute:
(i) it does not target speech alone or speech of specified
content but defines “profits of crime” as any property ob-
tained or income generated from the crime; (ii) it applies
only to persons convicted of a felony and thereby avoids
the prior law’s much broader definition encompassing
persons who admit to crimes or are convicted of misde-
meanors; and (iii) it requires that the income be gener-
ated “as a result of having committed the crime” and
thereby avoiding reaching income generated by reasons
separate and apart from the crime.45
There were other differences between the two versions.  Under the
1992 law, the victim was given three years from the date of discovery
of assets from the crime to bring a civil action, which could only be
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See discussion of changes made to other compensation laws infra Part IV B &
C.
43. S. 21017/A. 10915-B, 215th N.Y. Gen Ass., 2d Sess. (1992) (enacted as Act of
July 24, 1992, ch. 618 §§ 1-17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618-23 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAWS
§ 632-a (McKinney 1992)).
44. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1992) with N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a
(McKinney 1982).
45. Memorandum to the Governor from Attorney General Robert Abrams (July
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satisfied from these assets.46  Additionally, the targeted assets were
not automatically placed in an escrow account; rather the Board
was empowered to take traditional steps to protect the assets from
wasting.47
Like the original version of the law, the new version was in-
tended to achieve the State’s interest in making sure criminals do
not profit from their crimes.  The legislative history reveals that sup-
port for the bill also rested on the importance of this objective.  Let-
ters like one from Alliance for Consumer Rights declared,
“Victimized once at the hands of a wrongdoer, innocent citizens
should not be victimized again by criminals who salt their victim’s
wounds by profiting from the victim’s unwanted role in the crimi-
nal story.”48  Much like the sentiments expressed by the constitu-
ents in support of the law, the legislative history indicates that the
legislature’s rationale for re-passage of the Son of Sam law was par-
ticularly focused on preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes.49
While the law also facilitated victim compensation, this was not
its primary purpose, nor the primary means by which the legislature
intended to increase compensation.  The law was passed along with
a set of amendments to the restitution and tort laws, which were
solely intended to achieve the State’s interest of compensating vic-
tims.50  In particular, the tort law was amended to extend the stat-
ute of limitations for torts arising from criminal acts to seven years.
Discussing this general amendment of the tort law, a legislative
memo from the Governor explains this is “a first step towards im-
plementing our objective of compensating victims for their wrongs
suffered.”51  The next sentence goes on to discuss the Son of Sam
law, “[r]ecognizing that preventing criminals from profiting from
crime is a distinct and compelling State interest, [this bill] also cre-
ates a distinct three-year statute of limitations, dating from the time
46. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 1992).
47. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 1992).
48. Letter in Support of Revised Son of Sam law from Alliance for Consumer
Rights, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 1992, c. 618 at 46.
49. Gold memorandum supra note 39.
50. Abrams letter supra note 45.
51. Memorandum from Governor Mario Cuomo (July 24, 1992), Governor’s Bill
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a victim discovers that the perpetrator has or is receiving profits
from a crime.”52  Hence, the Son of Sam law allowed the State to
achieve its distinct objective of preventing criminals from profiting
from their crimes.  This is especially evident given the close overlap
between the Son of Sam law and the tort law also amended at the
same time.  The State acted to facilitate victim compensation by
amending the tort law for victims of crime and then attempted to
limit profiting from crime through the Son of Sam law.
In the package of bills passed in 1992, New York figured out
how to achieve both of the compelling interests recognized by the
Court through laws that were, arguably, sufficiently narrow and con-
tent-neutral.  Unlike the rash reaction to an unseemly political
problem that created the first law in 1977, the 1992 Son of Sam law
was a small part of a considered attempt to overhaul the State’s
compensation system. In a significant effort, changes were made to
numerous State laws that impact how victims of crime are compen-
sated.  Changes made were carefully calibrated to create a holistic
approach to how victims and perpetrators of crime are treated in
New York courts.  The laws complimented one another and worked
together to achieve the goals of the State.
New York’s new law was successfully passed in 1992 and re-
mained good law until it was amended by the legislature in 2001.
B. 2001: New York Goes Too Far
Once again, in 2001, the New York legislature was galvanized
into action by the horrific facts of a crime story.  This time the story
was that of David McClary who murdered New York City Police Of-
ficer Edward Bryne in 1988.53  McClary was found guilty and sen-
tenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in a New York State
prison.54  In 1990, McClary brought a civil rights lawsuit  pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging “that his placement in administrative
segregation for a period in excess of four years violated his proce-
dural due process rights.”55  In 1999, a jury found liability and Mc-
52. Id.
53. Memorandum from Governor George Pataki (June 25, 2002), Governor’s Bill
Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 5.
54. Id.
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Clary was awarded $660,000.56  The court found the jury verdict
excessive and gave McClary the option of consenting to remittitur
in order to avoid a new trial.  The verdict was remitted to $237,500,
the amount McClary had sought.57
By the time McClary won the judgment, the seven-year statute
of limitations for Police Officer Bryne’s family to bring a tort claim
relating to a crime58 had lapsed.  Officer Byrne’s family was barred
from bringing suit against McClary for damages.  The Son of Sam
law did not reopen the statute of limitations because McClary’s
newly-found assets were not profits from the crime.  The legislature
responded to the perceived injustice of this situation.  The legisla-
tive history of the amendment makes its purpose and rationale
abundantly clear:  “The shortcomings of the current Son of Sam law
are tragically illustrated in the case of murdered New York City Po-
lice Officer Edward Byrne.  The bill will remedy this injustice by
reviving the claims of crime victims and their families, such as the
family of Officer Byrne, and permit their recovery of expenses for
injuries and suffering.”59  In other words, the State was particularly
interested in ensuring that civil rights settlements won by prisoners
for violation of their rights in prison would be available to victims,
no matter how much time had passed since the commission of the
tort.
1. Changes: No Longer Limited to Profits, the “Funds of a
Convicted Person” Provision is Added
The most significant change made to the law in 2001 was the
addition of the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision.  A drastic
change from the limited targeting of profits of the crime, the law
now reopens the statute of limitations for tort actions not only
when the convicted person receives profits from crime, but also
when he or she receives money from ANY SOURCE.60  The addition of
this provision divorces the law from its original anti-profit moor-
56. McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
57. Id. at 218.
58. This special seven year statute of limitations for the victims of crime was insti-
tuted in the 1992 bundle of bills that also contained the new version of the Son of Sam
law. See generally Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 1992, c. 618.
59. Pataki Memorandum supra note 54.
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ings.  Now, the law acts as a general tort law, except it provides a
never-ending threat of suit (unlike the one or two year threat faced
in a typical tort context), and it only applies to people under the
watch of the criminal justice system.  With the addition of the
funds-of-a-convicted-person provision, the law can no longer be jus-
tified by the State’s interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit
from their crimes.61
The funds-of-a-convicted-person provision acts much like the
existing profits-from-a-crime provision.  A new statute of limitations
is triggered once money is detected and the victim then has three
years from the date of this discovery to bring suit.62  However, there
are three critical differences between the funds-of-a-convicted-per-
son provision and the profits-from-a-crime provision: (i) under new
provision the money that triggers the reopening of the statute of
limitations is money from any source totaling ten thousand dollars,
other than earned income or child support;63 (ii) the new provision
only applies to people under the watch of the criminal justice sys-
tem;64 and (iii) unlike the profits of the crime provision that applies
to all convicted felons,65 the new provision only applies to people
convicted of particular enumerated felonies, “specified crimes” de-
fined in the statute.66
61. While it might appear that the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision subsumes
the profits-from-a-crime provision, the two remain distinct.  The former only applies to
people while under the watch of the criminal justice system, plus an additional three
years.  Also, it only applies to people convicted of certain enumerated felonies.  The
latter, in contrast, has no such limits.  Hence it has much wider applicability and will
apply in many instances where the former does not.
62. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 2002).
63. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c) (McKinney 2002).
64. The new “funds of a convicted person” provision only applies to convicted
felons while they are under the watch of the criminal justice system – in prison, on
probation or parole – or if the money was accrued while the person was in the system
and not more than three years have passed since the person has been released. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c) (McKinney 2002).
65. The statute reads: “ ‘Profits from a crime’ mean (i) any property obtained
through or income generated from the commission of a crime of which the defendant
was convicted . . ..” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2002). “ ‘Crime’ means (i)
any felony defined in the laws of the state; or (ii) an offense in any jurisdiction which
includes all of the essential elements of any felony defined in the laws of this state. . ..”
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2002).
66. The statute reads, “Funds of a convicted person means all funds and property
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2. Changes: Under Both Provisions, All Assets are Now
Available
Another key change imposed by the 2001 amendment involves
the sources of funds available for satisfaction of a judgment won
under the Son of Sam law.  While the Son of Sam law simply allows
a victim to bring a tort action when he or she would otherwise be
barred by the operation of the statute of limitations, recovery pursu-
ant to the Son of Sam law claim was not the same as normal tort
recovery.  Under the 1992 version of the law, when the law applied
exclusively to proceeds of the crime, recovery was limited to the
assets targeted by the law—the proceeds from the crime.67  A plain-
tiff who brought suit pursuant to the provision could only recover
his or her pro rata share of the profits of the crime.  In 2001, the
law no longer contains this limit under either provision.
The legislative history makes it clear that under the funds-of-a-
convicted-person provision, recovery is permitted from all of the
convicted person’s assets.  As explained above, the law only applies
if a convicted person has amassed assets totaling ten thousand dol-
lars or more, from any source other than earned income or child
support.  However, once that ten thousand dollar limit is reached,
the victim can bring a tort action and recover any and all of the
convicted person’s assets.  While earned income and child support
cannot be used to calculate the ten thousand dollar trigger, when it
comes to recovery under the law there is no segregation of earned
income or child support.  Describing the ten thousand dollar trig-
ger excluding earned income and child support, the legislative his-
tory states, “[t]he sole purpose of the provision is to determine
whether a person must give notice; the provision has no effect on
the ability of a crime victim to recover a convicted person’s employ-
ment income in a civil action.”68  In other words, the section of the
statute defining the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision is used to
define when the reporting requirement and new liability period
kick in.  While earned income and child support are exempted
§ 632-a(1)(c) (McKinney 2002). See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(e) (McKinney 2002)
(defining “Specified Crime”).
67. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 1992) (stating “any damages awarded in
such action shall be recoverable only up to the value of the profits of the crime”).





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 36 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 16 16-APR-04 14:00
448 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
from the tallying of assets for the purpose of reporting under the
statute, funds from these sources, as well as all other sources, are
available to a plaintiff suing under the funds-of-a-convicted-person
provision of the law.69
The 2001 amendment also altered aspects of the profits-from-a-
crime provision.  Most significantly, the 2001 law appears to have
removed the limit on recovery that existed in the 1992 version.
While the 1992 version of the law explicitly limited recovery to the
profits of the crime, this language is missing from the 2001 profits
of the crime provision.70  The legislative history fails to directly
comment on this alteration. A memorandum from the bill sponsor
states generally,
[s]ignificantly, employment income earned by a con-
victed person, as well as all other forms of earned and
unearned income, are always recoverable by a crime vic-
tim once the crime victim commences a cause of action
pursuant to Executive Law [632]-a or any other statute of
limitations. . .. Any judgment obtained by a crime victim
against an inmate or prisoner may be enforced or exe-
cuted against all assets of such person except for the first
$1,000 on deposit in an institutional account to his or her
credit.71
This language, coupled with the removal of the language limiting
recovery, suggests that the legislature intended for recovery under
both the profits-from-a-crime provision and the funds-of-a-con-
victed-person provision to include all the convicted person’s assets.
Both provisions are used to trigger the reopening of the statute of
limitations, under which a plaintiff can obtain a civil judgment to
be satisfied from any and all of the defendant’s assets.72
69. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c) (McKinney 2002).
70. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 1992) with N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(3) (McKinney 2002).
71. Nozzolio Memorandum, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 12-13.
72. While the removal of the limit on recovery makes both provisions of the law
operate similarly once they are triggered, the two provisions are still distinct.  There are
circumstances in which one would allow suit and the other would not, for example,
when a convicted person amasses less than ten thousand dollars from the proceeds of a
crime.  In addition, the profits-from-a-crime provision can encompass earned income,
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In addition to apparently expanding recovery under the prof-
its-from-a-crime provision, the 2001 amendment also expanded the
crimes to which this provision applies.  While the funds-of-a-con-
victed-person provision only applies to certain specified felonies,
the profits-from-a-crime provision applies to all felonies.  In addi-
tion, the amendment extended the profits-from-a-crime crime pro-
vision to cover federal and out of state convictions, as long as the
victim was a resident of New York or the crime took place in state.73
This paper will show how, in its rush to address what it saw as
an important political problem, the legislature abandoned the logic
and cohesion achieved by the 1992 Son of Sam law in the State’s
victim compensation scheme.  Next, the paper will discuss recent
constitutional challenges brought against the amended law.  In the
following sections, this paper will look at the anti-profit laws
adopted by other states to illustrate the extent to which New York’s
amended law harshly deviates from its own original model, which
has now been adopted by the rest of the nation.  Then, it will con-
sider more carefully the ways in which the 2001 Amendment con-
flicts with New York’s existing civil liability and compensation
scheme, and the particular problems raised by the expansion of as-
sets available under the law.
C. Challenges in the Courts
1. Post–1992 Challenges
Between 1992 and 2001, when the law only applied to profits
from crime, there were only two reported cases involving the 1992
Son of Sam law in New York courts.74  Neither raised constitutional
73. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1992) with N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2002).
74. New York State Crime Victims Board v. T.J.M. Productions, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d
320 (1st Dept. 2000) (holding that the Crime Victims Board did not have standing
under New York Executive Law § 632-a to bring action to recover profits earned by
defendant for book about crime where there was no lawsuit brought by a victim); San-
dusky v. McCummings, 625 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that damages
award won by convicted person for injuries sustained while fleeing the crime scene did
not constitute profits of the crime under New York Executive Law § 632-a).  In 1995,
two cases were decided involving the original Son of Sam law. One involved the ques-
tion of how the Crime Victims Board was to dispose of funds collected under the origi-
nal, now invalidated, law.  New York State Crime Victims Board v. Abbott, 627 N.Y.S.2d
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challenges to the law.  It is particularly interesting that no further
First Amendment challenges were made to the law.  Many commen-
tators have argued that the legislature may have corrected the con-
stitutional infirmity because in Simon & Schuster the Supreme Court
seemed particularly concerned with the fact that the law “singled
out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it
place[d] on no other speech and no other income.”75  The Su-
preme Court agreed with the State that compensating victims and
preventing criminals from profiting were compelling interests.76
The Court found, specifically, that compensating victims with the
proceeds of crime is a compelling interest.77  The Court took issue
with the choice to limit victim compensation to only proceeds from
storytelling.78  But by expanding the law to allow recovery from all
profits, and no longer singling out speech as the only vulnerable
proceed, the law might be appropriately tailored as to avoid the
First Amendment problem in the eyes of the Court.79
funds. Id.  The other case involved a suit in federal court by plaintiff who claimed he
was unconstitutionally denied movie royalties under the original Son of Sam statute
where a production company had delivered profits from a real crime movie to the
Crime Victims Board.  Heath v. Warner Communications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 167, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).  The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
the plaintiff could not maintain the suit because he had been awarded profits as part of
settlement agreement under which he could not commence litigation for additional
profits without leave of the court. Id. at 170.  The court also held that the action was
barred by res judicata because the issues had been litigated before, even though in the
interim the statute had been held unconstitutional. Id. at 172.
75. Steven P. Vargas, New York’s Son of Sam Law: Alive and Well Today, 11 TOURO L.
REV. 629, 647 (1995) (quoting Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123); Andrew Michael
Lauri & Patricia M. Schaubeck, Like Father Like Son? The Constitutionality of New
York’s Son of Sam Law, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 279, 294 (1992) (arguing that
the law has fixed the problem that the Court identified in Simon & Schuster  While the
law will still be analyzed under strict scrutiny, the 1992 version will survive review be-
cause it is narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest.).
76. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118-19.
77. Id. at 120-21.
78. The Court explained, “[t]he Board cannot explain why the State should have
any greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of such ‘storytelling’
than from any of the criminal’s other assets.” Id. at 119.
79. Some commentators criticized the 1992 version of the law on other, non-con-
stitutional grounds. See, e.g., Adam Robert Tschorn, Beyond Son of Sam: Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, and a Constitutionally Valid Alternative to
New York Executive Law Section 632-A, 17 VT. L. REV. 321, 346-47 (1992) (arguing that the
1992 version of the law is under-inclusive regarding its definition of who counts as a
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2. Post-2001 Challenges
While the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision does not raise
the First Amendment problems posed by its companion (the prof-
its-from-a-crime provision) because it does not target speech, it
raises a host of other constitutional problems.  The amendment was
passed in 2001 and to date at least three cases have been filed chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the current law.80  These cases in-
volve Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the funds-of-a
convicted-person provision.  Two of these cases have resulted in de-
cisions at preliminary stages addressing some of the constitutional
claims.81
In Snuszki v. Wright, the plaintiff brought suit under the
amended version of Executive Law Section 632-a(1)(c), the funds-
of-a-convicted-person provision, against her mother’s killer for
money the defendant received in a civil rights settlement from the
New York State Department of Correctional Services.82  Wright, the
defendant, made a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, ar-
guing that the amended law was unconstitutional.83  Wright
claimed the amended law violated his constitutional rights to equal
protection, substantive due process, and his right to access the
courts.84  He claimed that he was being treated differently than
other similarly situated people, namely other tortfeasors, in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protec-
tion.85  He further argued that this unequal treatment inhibited
exercise of his fundamental rights.  Wright claimed that the law vio-
lated his substantive due process rights by limiting his access to the
courts.  He argued that the law’s revival of lapsed tort claims, years
what assets count as “profits of a crime.” Tschorn advocates for an alternative statute,
which he outlines in his article.).
80. Doe v. Cusack, 02 Civ. 9610 (DAB) (RLE) (S.D.N.Y. filed December 3, 2002);
Snuszki v. Wright, 751 N.Y.S2d 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); New York State Crime Victims
Board v. Majid, 749 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
81. Snuszki, 751 N.Y.S.2d 344; Majid, 749 N.Y.S.2d 837.
82. Snuszki, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 347.
85. Defendant’s Reply to the Intervener’s Memorandum of the Constitutionality
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after the incident, was arbitrary and conscious shocking.86  Lastly,
Wright claimed that the law violated his First Amendment right to
access the courts.87
The court addressed all three of the defendant’s constitutional
claims.  With regard to the defendant’s equal protection claim, the
court rejected Wright’s contention that a fundamental right was at
stake.88  It explained that there is no fundamental right to the pro-
tection of the statute of limitations.89  Furthermore, it held that this
law puts no restrictions on the defendant’s ability to access the
courts simply because any judgment he may receive can be used to
satisfy a judgment against him.90  Because no fundamental right was
implicated, and the defendant did not claim to be a member of a
protected class, the court analyzed the law under a rational basis
standard, requiring that governmental classifications be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.91  The court held that
the amended law satisfied this standard.92  In dicta, the court noted
that the Supreme Court recognized compensating victims as a com-
pelling governmental interest, while to pass this test the govern-
ment’s interest need only be legitimate.93  The court held that
extending the statute of limitations is rationally related to this inter-
est.94  Hence, the amended law satisfied the rational basis test.
With regard to Wright’s access to the courts claim, the court
held that the law places no affirmative restriction on the defendant
prohibiting him from pursuing legal relief for any wrong commit-
ted against him.95  Lastly, the court rejected Wright’s substantive
due process claim.  The court held that there is nothing “arbitrary,
conscience-shocking or oppressive” about allowing a victim to be
86. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Constitutionality of Section 632-a(3)
of the Executive Law at 19-20, Snuszki, 2002 WL 31687184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (No. 11-
0189/01) (citing Defendant’s Memorandum at 12).
87. Id.





93. Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105 (1991)).
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compensated.96  The court held again that no fundamental right of
Wright’s had been violated.97  Hence, the court upheld the funds-
of-a-convicted-person provision of the law and denied Wright’s mo-
tion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint.
In 1999, Abdul Majid was an inmate at Sullivan County Correc-
tion Facility.98  He brought a civil rights action against several New
York State corrections officers claiming that he had been subjected
to excessive force and severely injured by three correctional of-
ficers.  He also claimed that his First Amendment right to freely
exercise his religion while incarcerated had been violated.99  In No-
vember of 2001, the parties to the suit entered into a settlement,
under which Majid received fifteen thousand dollars for his
injuries.100
In New York State Crime Victims Board v. Majid, the Crime Victims
Board (“CVB”) brought a motion, pursuant to Executive Law § 632-
a(6), to enjoin Majid and the State from distributing money Majid
had received from the settlement.101  Majid claimed that the
amended Son of Sam law violated his constitutional rights.  It was
unclear what provision of the law he was challenging, but because
the question of the constitutionality of the statute of limitations was
not ripe,102 the court assumed the challenges applied to the section
of the statute under which the plaintiff was seeking an injunction,
Executive Law Section 632-a(6) (“subsection 6”).  Subsection 6 is
the section of the law that gives the CVB the power to protect the
assets at issue by seeking provisional remedies, such as attachment,
injunction, receivership and notice of pendency, otherwise availa-
ble to a plaintiff.103
96. Id. at 348-49.
97. Id. at 349.
98. Majid v. Wilhelm, 110 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
99. Id.
100. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Declaratory and Injunctive Re-
lief at 5, Majid v. Crime Victims Board (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 02 CV-2907).  This case is distinct
from Majid v. New York Crime Victims Board.  It appears to be a suit brought by Majid to
avoid the action that was subsequently brought for an injunction by the Crime Victims
Board in Majid, 749 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).  This memorandum is on file
with the author.
101. Majid, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
102. Id. at 840.
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The court granted the plaintiff an injunction, holding that sub-
section 6 of the amended law did not violate Majid’s constitutional
rights.  The court held that there was no ex post facto104 violation
because subsection 6 merely allows the CVB to apply to courts for
pre-existing provisional remedies.105  Not only is there no creation
of a criminal penalty, there is no creation of a new civil remedy
because all the law allows is realization of the lapsed tort remedy.106
With regards to Majid’s procedural due process claim, the court
held that Majid had received notice of the CVB’s action and had
fought it vigorously, so he had been afforded due process of the
law.107  The court held that there was no substantive due process
problem because there was a reasonable connection between the
State’s interest in compensating victims and allowing the CVB to
protect assets from wasting.108  Lastly, the court held there was no
equal protection problem posed by giving the CVB the ability to
apply for remedies that are available to all others, including the
defendant himself.109  Hence, a New York court upheld another as-
pect of the amended Son of Sam law.
3. Potential for Success in the Courts
At first glance, the Son of Sam law, particularly the funds-of-a-
convicted-person provision, raises constitutional questions.  There
are due process implications, as well as equal protection questions,
raised by the application of the law.  While these claims have strong
rhetorical appeal, they will likely face skepticism in the courts.  As
explained in more detail below, it will be difficult to establish that
this law infringes upon a fundamental right or discriminates against
104. The Constitution prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws by states.  U.S.
Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.  An ex post facto law is a law that retroactively makes conduct
criminal after the conduct has occurred.  Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir.
1997).  In order for a statute to violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution, it
must be a penal law.  A statute is not considered penal, even if it has punitive aspects, if
its primary purpose is regulatory. Id. at 1274.  In extreme cases, a civil penalty can be
“so punitive in fact” that it violates the Ex Post Facto clause. Id. at 1275.  However, this
is a difficult standard to satisfy.  The court in New York Crime Victims Board v. Majid
rejected this claim with respect to the Son of Sam law, as other courts likely will as well.
105. Majid, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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a protected class.  Courts are likely to analyze its validity applying a
rational basis standard, under which the law will survive.
Under the equal protection clause, the Son of Sam law is likely
to be analyzed under a rational basis standard because no protected
class is targeted by the law.  It is not hard to establish that the law
treats similarly situated groups differently.  Criminal tortfeasors are
treated differently than non-criminal tortfeasors.  People under the
watch of the criminal justice system are treated differently than
those who have completed their sentences.  Yet, because no pro-
tected class is targeted for this differential treatment, the govern-
ment need only justify its actions by proving that the law is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.110  Given
the Court’s holding in Simon & Schuster, acknowledging the State’s
compelling interests in compensating victims and preventing
criminals from profiting from crime,111 it seems unlikely that any
court will find that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.  Given that the Supreme Court decided the issue in
dictum, no court is likely to hold that New York’s law is not rational.
Similarly, substantive due process claims are likely to receive
rational basis review because of the difficulty of establishing that the
law infringes on a fundamental right.112  The difficulty with show-
ing that a fundamental right is infringed upon, which has been
raised in this context as a right to privacy, familial association, and
property,113 is that a plaintiff will have to explain why under the
110. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(explaining “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest . . . The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race,
alienage, or national origin.  These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy — a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others.  For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scru-
tiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”).
111. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118-19.
112. Laws that infringe on fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny,
requiring the government to meet a higher standard to justify its actions.  Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).






      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 40 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-APR-04 14:00
456 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
initial tort statute of limitations there is no constitutional problem,
but under the expanded one there is.  The fact that the Son of Sam
law does not provide for any new remedies makes such an argu-
ment particularly difficult. If a regular tort suit is constitutional, it is
hard to argue that a suit brought under the Son of Sam law is not,
given that there is no substantive difference in between the two
causes of action.  This claim is further undermined by the fact that
legislatures have broad authority to set and alter statutes of limita-
tions as they see fit, and the Court has held that when they do, no
constitutional rights are implicated.114  Hence, it will be difficult for
a plaintiff to convince a court that the extension of time to bring a
suit, alone, infringes on a fundamental right.
A procedural due process claim appears the least likely to pre-
vail because the convicted person is afforded process – he or she
can challenge any attachment of money prior to judgment; is al-
lowed to litigate the question of damages in court; and liability is
based on the criminal conviction, where the person presumably re-
ceived due process.  Even the retroactive application of the
amended Son of Sam law fails to raise a significant due process
problem because of a line of Supreme Court cases that acknowl-
edges the broad discretion legislatures have to amend and retroac-
tively apply statutes of limitations without warning.115  While the
federal due process clause holds little hope, in Section IV.C.1 be-
low, I suggest an alternative State due process claim that has not
been raised and that warrants further inquiry.
While they might not ultimately prevail, constitutional chal-
lenges are valuable because they provide strong rhetorical argu-
ments against the law.  Even if there is not an equal protection
violation, for example, there are glaring equal protection concerns
raised by the law that can be used to build organizing momentum
and to educate the public about the importance of protecting pris-
oners’ rights.  Ultimately, lobbying and litigation used in tandem to
illustrate the inconsistencies of the law and why it is such  poor pol-
icy may be more likely to bring about change than constitutional
challenges alone.  Cases like the ones discussed above bring to light
how unfair the law can be.  Prisoners’ rights advocates wishing to
114. See discussion infra note 213.





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 41 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 25 16-APR-04 14:00
2004] SON OF SAM 457
challenge the law should use such cases to show lawmakers that the
law is unfair and irrational.  The next section will highlight three
additional, non-constitutional, problems posed by the law as
amended.  Again, discussion of these problems may help advocates
prove to lawmakers why this law should be changed.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW
In this section, I will discuss a few key problems I believe are
posed by the current Son of Sam law.  Because the law was
amended so recently, to date there has been no legal scholarship
examining the impact of the new expansion of the law.  The argu-
ments I raise are intended to flag aspects of the law that are particu-
larly vulnerable to attack, which might be useful to advocates
planning to challenge the amended law either in the courts or in
the legislature.  First, to provide a larger context within which to
consider the harsh provisions of New York’s law, I will look at an-
tiprofit laws of other states.  Next, I will consider the conflicts be-
tween the Son of Sam law and other provisions of New York victim
compensation law.  This comparison, in particular, highlights the
problems raised by the expansion of the statute of limitations in the
funds-of-a-convicted-person provision.  Last, I will look at one of the
most problematic aspects of the amended law, the expansion of re-
covery to all funds held by the convicted person.
A. New York v. EVERYONE ELSE: A Fifty State Survey
A survey of the antiprofit laws found in other states reveals that
New York’s law, as it stands after the 2001 amendment, is far more
punitive than the laws found in other states.  It also shows the ex-
tent to which New York has deviated from the model it created,
while the rest of the states with similar laws have remained true to
the format and purposes of the original law.
After New York passed the original Son of Sam law in 1977, the
majority of states and the federal government followed its lead.
Only three states failed to pass some form of the law: New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, and Vermont.116  Subsequently, in seven
116. Sean J. Kealy, A Proposal for a New Massachusetts Notoriety-for-Profit Law: The
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states, Son of Sam laws have been repealed and not replaced.117
Today, the federal government118 and forty states have antiprofit
laws in place.119
1. Expansion of the Statute of Limitations: New York’s
Rejection of the Anti-Profit Model
At their core, many state laws operate like New York’s: they ex-
tend or renew civil claims otherwise barred by the tort statute of
limitations.120  In twenty-six states, the tort statute of limitations is
replaced with a new time clock that runs from the discovery of the
targeted funds or the establishment of an escrow account for such
117. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 145/1 to 14 (repealed 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1831 to 1839 (repealed 1997); MA ST 258A § 8; §§ 1 to 9 (repealed 1993 (eff. Jan.
1, 1995)); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (repealed 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.265 (repealed 1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 8309-1 (repealed 1993); CAL
CIV. CODE § 2225 (Statute held unconstitutional on first amendment grounds by Kee-
nan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. 2002)).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (2003).
119. ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to 84 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (Michie 2002);
ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN §§ 13-4201-4202 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4.1-201-207 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
218 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 §§ 9101 to 9106 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512
(2002); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to 32 (2002); HAW REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 351-81 to 88
(2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-1 to 7 (2002); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 910.15 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319-7321 (2002); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 346.165 (Michie 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 14, § 752-E (West 2002); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM PROC § 11-621 – 633 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West
2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to 11 (2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-101-133 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1835 to 1840
(Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-28 to 33 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-
22 (Michie 2002) (repealed eff. July 1, 2006); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2002);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to .06 (West
2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (2001); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8312 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-1 to 12 (2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-25-500- 570 (Law. Co-op 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-28A-1 to 14
(Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-401 to 411 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-
8.3 – 8.5 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .22 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.68.200 to 290 (2002); W.VA. CODE §§ 14-2B-1 to 11 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.165 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-301 to 308 (Michie 2002).
120. I assume that the statutes that provide a number of years within which a victim
must bring suit are providing a limitations period distinct from the one established for
regular torts.  Furthermore, most statutes run from the date the funds are discovered or
the escrow account for the funds is establishes.  Hence, the running of the statute of
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funds.121  In six states, the antiprofit law extends the time after the
commission of the crime within which the victim may bring a civil
action.122  While many states use these laws to extend or reopen the
statute of limitations to bring a civil action against a criminal
tortfeasor, there are some states that do not use these laws to alter
121. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (2002) (complainant has 5 years from establishment of
escrow account); ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN §§ 13-4202(B)(2) (2002) (complainant has 5
years from establishment of escrow account to bring claim to commission); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201 (2002) (complainant has 5 years from establishment of escrow
account); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 § 9103 (2001) (complainant has 5 years from estab-
lishment of escrow account); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (2002) (complainant has 5
years from the establishment of escrow account); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (2002)
(complainant has 5 years from establishment of escrow account); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 910.15(7) (2002) (complainant has 5 years from establishment of escrow account);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(d) (2002) (complainant has 6 months from date of notifica-
tion of funds); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(2),(4) (Michie 2002) (complainant has 5
years from date the Board receives profits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 14, § 752-E (West
2002) (complainant has 3 years from the discovery of the profits of the crime); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM PROC § 11-626 (2002) (complainant has 5 years from establishment of
escrow account); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(4)(b) (2002) (complainant has 5 years
from the date on which the money is paid to the Crime Victims Board); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-38-7(2002) (complainant has 1 year from the establishment of escrow ac-
count); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-1838 (Michie 2002) (complainant has 5 years from
date money is paid into escrow account); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 2002) (com-
plainant has 5 years from establishment of escrow account); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2969.03 (West 2002) (complainant has 3 years from establishment of escrow ac-
count); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(3)(b) (2001) (complainant has 5 years from establish-
ment of escrow account); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8312(b) (West 2002) (complainant
has 3 years from the discovery of the profits); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-4 (2002) (com-
plainant has 3 years from date of last payment into criminal royalties fund); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-25-530 (Law. Co-op 2002) (complainant has 3 years from discovery of prof-
its); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-28A-3 (Michie 2002) (complainant has 5 years from
establishment of escrow account); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-403, 404 (2002) (com-
plainant has 3 years from establishment of escrow account); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.68.200 (2002) (complainant has 5 years from the establishment of escrow account);
W.VA. CODE §§ 14-2B-1 to 11 (2002)(prosecutor has 3 years from notice of the funds);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(10) (West 2001) (complainant has 3 years from the establish-
ment of the escrow account); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-303(b)(ii) (Michie 2002) (com-
plainant has 5 years from the establishment of the escrow account).
122. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(c) (Michie 2002) (complainant has 10 years from
date of crime or discovery of perpetrator); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(c)(2) (Michie
2001) (complainant has 5 years from the filing of the charges, presumably in the crimi-
nal prosecution); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (2002) (complainant has 5 years
from date of crime); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-125 (2002) (complainant has 1 year from
date of crime); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(2) (2001) (complainant has 6 years from
the date of conviction); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(C) (West 2002) (complainant has
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the existing tort statute of limitations.  Rather the antiprofit law is
used to protect assets, usually by authorizing the creation of an es-
crow account, in order to satisfy civil judgments and restitution or-
ders granted under the existing tort timeframe.123
The alteration of the statute of limitations is a characteristic
New York’s law shares with the majority of other states.  Yet New
York has drastically deviated from the practice of other states with
respect to what triggers the antiprofit law and thereby the new lia-
bility period.  In New York, after the 2001 amendment, in addition
to being triggered by profits of the crime, a new liability period is
also triggered by the receipt of funds totaling ten thousand dollars
from any source other than earned income and child support,
under the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision.124  A drastic de-
123. HAW REV. STAT. ANN. § 351-88 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-6.3-1 to 7 (2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie
2002) (repealed eff. July 1, 2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .22 (Michie 2002).
Florida does have an anti-profit statute, but it seems to be used to supply restitution and
does not require the victim to bring a civil action.  It, therefore, has no effect on the
existing statute of limitations. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (2002).  Utah has laws that
allow courts to prohibit a convicted person from selling his or her story as a condition
of a sentence of incarceration or probation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 – 8.5 (2002).
124. The New York statute states in relevant part:
(1)(c) “Funds of a convicted person” means all funds and property
received from any source by a person convicted of a specified crime, or by
the representative of such person. . . excluding child support and earned
income, where such person:
(i) is an inmate serving a sentence with the department of correc-
tional services or a prisoner at a local correctional facility or federal correc-
tional institute . . .; or
(ii) is not an inmate or prisoner but who is serving a sentence of pro-
bation or conditional discharge or is presently subject to an undischarged,
indeterminate, determinate or finite term of imprisonment or person of
post-release supervision or term of supervised release  . . .; or
(iii) is no longer subject to a sentence of probation or conditional dis-
charge or indeterminate, determinate or definite term of imprisonment or
period of post-release supervision or term of supervised release, and where
within the previous three years: the full or maximum term or periods termi-
nated or expired of such a person was granted discharge by a board of
parole pursuant to applicable law . . . and includes only [money received
within the three years from interests, benefit of any kind, recovery, awards,
etc accrued before the expiration of the sentence.]
2(a). Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or
other legal entity, or representative of such person, firm, corporation, part-
nership, association or entity, which knowingly contracts for, pays, or agrees
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parture from its own antiprofit model and the laws of the rest of the
nation, this is one of the most fundamental changes made by the
State in the recent amendment.125  New York’s law now provides
extended liability – in some cases never-ending liability – over assets
having nothing to do with the criminal act at issue.  In all other
states, the laws remain true to their anti-profit motivations.  In
twenty-six states the new limitations period or creation of escrow
account is triggered by receipt of profits from the sale of the crime
story.126  In twelve other states, the trigger occurrence is the receipt
of proceeds of the crime more generally.127  By using the receipt of
victed of that crime . . .; or (ii) any funds of a convicted person, as defined
in paragraph (c) of subdivision one of this section, where such conviction is
for a specified  crime and the value, combined value or aggregated value of
the payment or payments of such funds exceeds or will exceed ten thou-
sand dollars, shall give written notice to the crime victims board of the pay-
ment or obligation to pay as soon as practicable after discovering that the
payment or intended payment constitutes profits from a crime of funds of a
convicted person. . . .
3. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the estates, powers
and trust law or the civil practice law and rules with respect to the timely
bringing of an action, any crime victim shall have the right to bring a civil
action in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover money damages from
a person convicted of a crime of which the crime victim is a victim, or the
representative of that convicted person, within three years of the discovery
of any profits from a crime or funds of a convicted person, as those terms
are defined in this section.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2002).
125. See implications of this expansion discussed infra Part IV.C.
126. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(a) (Michie 2002); ARI-
ZONA REV. STAT. ANN § 13-4202 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(a)(1) (Michie
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 § 9103
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (2002); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 351-81 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 74-7319 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(1) (Michie 2002); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM PROC § 11-622 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768(1) (West 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(1)(a) (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5(2002); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-9-104 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-1836 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-28 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie 2002) (repealed eff.
July 1, 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.02 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-1 (Michie 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 –
8.5 (2002) (note that Utah’s law differs from the rest; in Utah the anti-notoriety law
allows the court to prohibit a convicted person from selling his or her story as a condi-
tion of his or her sentence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.165(2) (West 2001).
127. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (2002);
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any money (no longer only money connected to the commission of
the crime) to trigger Section 632-a, New York’s law can no longer
be justified by the antiprofit rationale that was the impetus for this
law originally.128
2. Expansion of Available Funds
Another significant difference between the New York law and
the laws of other states has to do with what funds are available to a
victim who brings suit pursuant to an antiprofit law.  While tradi-
tional tort law allows recovery from all assets, most antiprofit laws
limit recovery to the sources of money targeted by the statute.  The
limited recovery under antiprofit laws becomes significant when the
statute of limitations for the traditional tort claim has lapsed.  In
many states, the victim’s recovery under the antiprofit laws is lim-
ited to the money targeted by the statute (either profits from the
sale of the story or profits of the crime), which in many cases will be
less than recovery under tort law.  A number of statutes state this
explicitly.129  Other states imply this by placing the targeted funds
2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(1)(e) (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A)
(West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(1) (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8312(a) (West
2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-520 (Law. Co-op 2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.20
(Michie 2002); W.VA. CODE § 14-2B-3 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-303(a) (Michie
2002).
128. See discussion of New York’s repudiation of this rationale infra Part IV.  Note
that Tennessee is the one other state where all of a defendant’s money is attachable
under the law. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-401 to 411 (2002).  However, there is some
internal inconsistency in the law making it hard to determine through statutory inter-
pretation alone how the law operates.  For example, the law is called “Victim Compen-
sation from the Proceeds of the Crime Act of 1994.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-401
(2002).  Yet it authorizes the collection of all of the defendant’s income – not just pro-
ceeds of the crime. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-403 (2002).  Also, the law states that the
statute of limitations does not start to run until all money owed to the defendant under
“the contract” have been paid into the escrow account, suggesting that perhaps the law
is concerned with contracts for profits of the crime. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-404
(2002).  Yet, the statute fails to state what kind of contract it references.
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(2) (2001) (All profits from the crime belonging
to the convicted felon are subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the benefi-
ciaries set forth in this section.  The trust continues until six years after the date of
conviction. If an action is filed by a beneficiary to recover the beneficiary’s interest in a
trust within that time limitations, the trust character of the property continues until the
conclusion of the action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2969.03 (West 2002)  (“if the civil
action is brought after the expiration of the statute of limitations that would apply to





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 44 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 31 16-APR-04 14:00
2004] SON OF SAM 463
in an escrow account used to satisfy civil judgments.130  There are a
small number of states that do not expand the statute of limitations,
and therefore do not alter recovery allowed under the tort law.131
Under New York’s amended law, however, there is no limit to the
assets available to the victim during this renewed statutory pe-
victim that the judgment may be enforced only against the separate account maintained
in the name of that offender in the recovery of offender’s profits fund”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 147.275(3) (2001) (A victim can recover damages from escrow account containing
proceeds of the crime if he or she brings a civil action within five years of the date the
account is established); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8312(b) (West 2002) (“Right of action.
Notwithstanding other rules of civil procedure, victim has 3 years from discovery of
profit to bring civil action.  Any damages awarded only payable up to amount of prof-
its”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-530 (Law. Co-op 2002) (“Victim can bring civil action for
damages anytime within three years of discovery of profits.  Damages are recoverable up
to amount of profits.”); W.VA. CODE § 14-2B-5 (2002) (“ . . . If, but for the provisions of
this section, any party would be barred from bringing an action due to the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations, said party may not recover damages against the
defendant in excess of the value of the crime profits allotted to said party by the court
in accordance with the provisions of this article”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-303(b)
(Michie 2002)(Notwithstanding any other applicable statute of limitations, any person
who is a victim of the criminal act from which a defendant receives profits under sub-
section (a) of this section may, within five (5) years of the establishment of the escrow
account: (i) Enforce any order of restitution entered against the defendant against the
monies on deposit in the escrow account; or (ii) Bring a civil action in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to recover a judgment against the defendant or the defendant’s rep-
resentatives or designees and enforce the judgment against monies on deposit in the
escrow account).
130. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(b) (Michie 2002); ARI-
ZONA REV. STAT. ANN § 13-4202(2)(b) (West 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(c)(1)
(2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a)
(2002); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 §§ 9103 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-31 (West
2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 2002);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(2) (Michie 2002); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM PROC § 11-624 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 2002); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-7 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-125 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1835 to 1840 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 2002); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 17(C) (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-3 (Michie 2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 to 290 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(4)-(6)
(West 2001).  Maine’s law does not provide for the creation of an escrow account, but
does suggest that recovery under the law is limited to profits from the crime.  For exam-
ple, the law outlines requirements for when an entity paying profits of a crime has to
give notice to the victim of such profits, and then the statute provides an extended
limitations period to run from the date of the discovery of profits from the crime. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 14, § 752-E (West 2002).
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riod.132  The only other states that seem to allow such broad recov-
ery outside the traditional tort limitations period are Rhode
Island133 and, possibly, Tennessee.134  By allowing such broad re-
covery outside the traditional tort recovery period, New York forces
its criminal tortfeasors to face the threat of tort liability for far
longer than criminal tortfeasors almost anywhere else in the
country.
132. While earned income is not used to calculate whether § 632-a is triggered, it is
available for recovery in a suit commenced pursuant to § 632-a. A memorandum from
Governor Pataki makes this clear, “funds earned as employment income will generally
not be used to determine whether a convicted person has received in excess of $10,000
and, therefore, whether notice must be given to the [Crime Victims Bureau] . . . The
sole purpose of the provision is to determine whether a person must give notice.  The
provision has no effect on the ability of a crime victim to recover a convicted person’s
employment income in a civil action.”  Memorandum from Governor George Pataki
(June 25, 2002), Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 1306.  A statement from the
bill’s sponsor also confirms this, “Significantly, employment income earned by a con-
victed person, as well as all other forms of earned and unearned income, are always
recoverable by a crime victim once the crime victim commences a cause of action pur-
suant to Executive Law (632)-a or another other statute of limitations.”  Nozzolio Mem-
orandum, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 11. See policy implications infra
Section IV.C.
133. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-4.1 (2002) (“Assets available.  A victim, his or her
guardian, or in the case of a deceased victim, his or her legal representative, in addition
to any rights conveyed pursuant to this chapter, may seek recovery from any of the
criminally responsible person’s assets.  A victim may proceed against the defendant’s
assets, whether or not these assets represent royalties obtained from the commercial
exploitation of the crime.”).
134. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-403 (2002) (“all income of Defendant’s after the
date of the crime is collected & put into acct. victim can collect as long as civil action
brought within 3 years of crime”).  The Tennessee law is confusing, however, because in
a number of other sections it suggests that the purpose of the law is to collect proceeds
from the crime, not income generally as this section suggests.  For example, the short
title of the law is “Victim Compensation from the Proceeds of the Crime Act of 1994.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-13-404 (2002).  Also, the section discussing the statute of limita-
tions states:
Statue of Limitations for bringing civil action under 403(b) doesn’t start
running until:
(1) All moneys owing to the defendant under the terms of the contract
have been paid to the attorney general and reporter; and
(2) An escrow account has been established for the benefit of the defen-
dant’s victims.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-13-404 (2002). It is not clear from the plain reading of the stat-
ute what contract is being referred to in this section.  Like the short title, this reference
suggests that the real target of the statute is profit from the crime, made by entering
into a contract for profit.  Hence, this confusion in the Tennessee statute suggests that
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3. The Targeted Population
A final significant difference between New York’s law and that
of other states is found in the description of the targeted popula-
tion.  Seventeen states only apply their antiprofit laws to people
convicted of crimes.135  Twenty-one states also target people ac-
cused of crimes.136  Alaska is the only state where the “offender”
must be someone who committed a crime in the state, without re-
gard to conviction or indictment.137  In most states, the antiprofit
law applies to all crimes, however, eight states limit the law’s appli-
cability to crimes classified as felonies.138  A smaller number of
states further limit the class of people impacted by the law.  Con-
necticut’s law is limited to profits derived as a result of a crime of
violence.139  Under the Utah law, a court may prohibit a convicted
person from selling his or her story as a condition of his or her
sentence of probation.140  Wisconsin’s law only applies to money
135. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201(1) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West
2002); HAW REV. STAT. ANN. § 351-82 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West
2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 780.768(1) (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(1) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-1836 (Michie 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(e)(1) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2969.01 (West 2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8312(a) (West 2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-25-510 (Law. Co-op 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 – 8.5 (2003); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19 (Michie 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-303(a) (Michie 2003).
136. ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN § 13-4201(1) (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-218(a) (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11 § 9101 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-
14-30 to 32 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (Michie 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3
(2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319-7321 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 14, § 752-
E(2) (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-621(b)(1) (2002); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 99-38-5 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(d) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28
(West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17
(West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(1)(a) (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1 (2002);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-1 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-402(3)
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE § 14-2B-3(d)
(2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West 2002).
137. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(d),(e) (Michie 2002) (in the absence of a criminal
conviction, the statute requires the victim to prove that the defendant committed the
crime by a preponderance of the evidence).
138. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4201(1) (West 2003);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (Michie 2003); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 910.15 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(1)  (West 2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-07.1-01 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2 (2002).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 2003).
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received from the commission of “serious crimes,”141 as defined by
Wisconsin’s Criminal Procedure Law.142  New York, however, is the
only state that treats people under the watch of the criminal justice
system differently from people outside the criminal justice
system.143
The funds-of-a-convicted-person provision of the New York law
only targets people currently in the criminal justice system.  It does
this by incorporating this distinction into the statute’s definition of
funds-of-a-convicted-person.  Unlike the profits-from-a-crime provi-
sion of the New York law that applies to all convicted felons for the
rest of their lives,144 the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision of
the law only applies to people convicted of certain felonies while
they are in prison, on parole or probation, plus an additional three
years after the end of their sentence.145  New York has singled out
people under the watch of the criminal justice system for this partic-
ularly harsh penalty: as long as you are in the criminal justice sys-
tem, you face the threat of tort liability whenever you accrue assets.
While some may argue that targeting fewer people is better
than targeting more, the danger of such narrow targeting is that
politically unpopular groups have to bear the brunt of unfair legis-
lation that would not be accepted if applied to a broader class of
people.  Here the legislature is applying a uniquely harsh civil pen-
alty to a small, unpopular, and, for the most part, politically power-
less minority that will have difficulty fighting back.
By expanding the statute of limitations to allow a new tort ac-
tion when a convicted person amasses assets from any source, by
expanding the victim’s recovery to all of the convicted felon’s as-
sets, and by only applying these two new, harsh sanctions to people
under the watch of the criminal justice system, New York’s law is out
of step and much harsher than national norms in this area.  New
York’s law is both broader and much narrower than the laws of
other states.  It allows for recovery of a much broader category of
assets, but it also targets a small group of people for particularly
harsh treatment under the law.  The inconsistencies between New
141. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West 2002).
142. Id. § 969.08(10)(b).
143. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c) (McKinney 2002).
144. Id. § 632-a(1)(b).
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York and other states call into question the logic and usefulness of
New York’s current law.  The irrationality of New York’s law is sug-
gested by the fact that while it used to be model legislation, no
other state (save one perhaps) has followed the changes it imple-
mented in 2001.  Looking to other states is one way to convince
legislatures, and perhaps courts, that New York’s law is much less
effective than it should be and much more draconian than it need
be.
B. Conflicts with New York Compensation Law
As the last section illustrated, New York’s law significantly di-
verges from the antiprofit laws found in other states in many impor-
tant ways.  This section will consider the various ways that the New
York Son of Sam law, as amended, is inconsistent with other provi-
sions of New York law intended to facilitate victim compensation,
namely restitution/reparations law and tort law.  Ultimately, these
inconsistencies reveal the extent to which the 2001 amendment of
New York’s Son of Sam law is an illogical and inappropriate addi-
tion to the State’s existing compensation law framework.
1. Restitution & Reparations
a. Overview of Restitution/Reparation Law
Like most states, New York has criminal restitution and repara-
tion laws that allow criminal courts to order compensation of vic-
tims as part of a convicted person’s sentence.  As New York
Jurisprudence Second explains, “[r]estitution and reparation are alter-
native conditions. Their distinction is qualitative: restitution con-
sists of the fruits of the offense, and reparation consists of an
amount the defendant can afford to pay.  The choice of either is, by
the statutory language, permissive, alternative, and discretionary,
but must be reasonable.”146  Restitution “is a procedure whereby
the court has discretion to place a defendant on probation, and at
the same time prevent him from profiting by his criminal act.”147
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Under New York law, courts have a strong mandate to consider
awarding restitution and reparations in criminal cases.148  New York
Penal Law Section 60.27 states, “[i]n addition to any of the disposi-
tions authorized by this article, the court shall consider restitution
or reparation to the victim of the crime and may require restitution
or reparation as part of the sentence imposed upon a person con-
victed of an offense.”149  The Section goes on to explain that in
cases where the victim impact statement or the district attorney in-
form the court that the victim is seeking restitution or reparation,
“the court shall require, unless the interests of justice dictate other-
wise, in addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article
that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and
reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss. . ..”150  The court is re-
quired to make a finding as to the out-of-pocket loss suffered by the
victim and the exact dollar amount of any fruits of the crime.151  In
making the finding, the court must consider the victim impact
statement and if the record fails to provide sufficient evidence, or if
the defendant requests one, the court must conduct a hearing on
the issue.  Generally, the court may not award reparations or restitu-
tion in excess of fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a felony, or
ten thousand dollars in the case of any offense other than a fel-
ony.152  The statute requires the court to clearly state its reasons for
declining to order reparations or restitution on the record.153
A number of the current provisions found in Section 60.27
were implemented in 1992, in the same bundle of legislation that
148. Others have argued for that restitution law in New York, instead of the Son of
Sam law, is a more appropriate way to compensate victims. See generally Michelle
Liebeskind, Back to Basics for Victims: Striking Son of Sam Laws in Favor of an Amended
Restitution Scheme, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (1994).
149. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27(1) (McKinney 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 60.27(2).
152. Id. § 60.27(5)(a),(b). There are three exceptions allowing a court to exceed
the amount limits provided for in this section: (i)“the court in its discretion may impose
restitution or reparation in excess of the amounts specified . . . provided however that
the amount in excess must be limited to the return of the victim’s property, including
money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement for medical expenses actu-
ally incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offense committed by
the defendant;” (ii)  the defendant consents; or (iii)as a condition of probation or con-
ditional discharge as provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision two of section 65.10.
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passed the Son of Sam law.  The cap on restitution and reparation
awards was raised from ten thousand to fifteen thousand dollars in
felony cases and from five thousand to ten thousand dollars in cases
other than felonies.154  The requirement that sentencing courts de-
termine the dollar amount of the fruits of the offense and the out-
of-pocket loss of the victim, using the victim impact statement, was
added.  The definition of victim, for the purposes of receiving resti-
tution and reparation, was expanded.  The presumption that sen-
tencing courts impose reparation or restitution, unless the interests
of justice require otherwise, was added.  Lastly, the bill added the
requirement that the court place its reasons on the record if it
chooses to deny restitution or reparation.155  In addition to these
amendments of the principle restitution and reparation law, section
60.27, other changes were made to other provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Law, the Penal Law, and the Executive Law as they ap-
plied to restitution and reparations.156
b. Conflicts Between Son of Sam Law & Restitution/
Reparation Law
As shown above, it is evident that New York restitution and rep-
aration law overlaps with the purpose of the Son of Sam law to a
great extent.  As noted above, the two bodies of law were both
amended in 1992, along with other laws impacting victim compen-
sation, and were intended to work in tandem to ensure adequate
victim compensation.  Changes made to the body of laws impacting
restitution and reparation were intended to “help ensure that more
victims obtain order[s] of restitution and reparation that will be
based on most, if not all, of the actual losses they suffered as a result
of the crime.”157  The amendments were used to cure inconsisten-
154. Memorandum of Senator Emmanuel Gold, Governor’s Bill Jacket to L. 1992,
c. 618 at 6.
155. Id.
156. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30, amended by L. 1992, c. 618 §§ 3,4; N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §  410.90, amended by L. 1992, c. 618 § 5; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.10,
amended by L. 1992, c. 618 §§ 6, 7, 8; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.30, amended by L. 1992,
c. 618 § 9; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05, amended by L. 1992, c. 618 § 14; N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 65.10, amended by L. 1992, c. 618 § 15; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 641, amended by L. 1992, c. 618
§ 11.
157. Memorandum from Attorney General Robert Abrams, to Mario Cuomo, Gov-
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cies in the law, including the fact that there was no ceiling on resti-
tution orders as a condition of probation while ceilings were placed
on restitution from defendants sent to prison.158  The legislative his-
tory also reports that New York is the only state that imposes a mon-
etary ceiling on restitution orders: “New York State stands alone in
limiting judicial discretion by setting a specific dollar cap on such
orders, regardless of a victim’s total damages and regardless of a
defendant’s ability to pay.”159
The purpose of the 1992 amendments was to increase victims’
ability to recover damages. Yet, the legislative history in general,
and specifically with respect to restitution and reparation, evidences
a desire to balance the interests of the victim and the convicted
person.  Under New York restitution law, the court is required to
consider economic status of the defendant in coming to its find-
ing.160  As the1992 legislative history explains, consideration of
both the victim’s loss and the defendant’s finances “serve to prevent
the victim from enjoying an unjust enrichment, and the defendant
from suffering under an unduly harsh and unreasonable restitution
order.”161  This balancing of interests is also achieved by the provi-
sion found in Section 60.27 of the Penal Law providing that restitu-
tion and reparation shall not be ordered where they are not in the
interests of justice.162  Regard for the interests of justice is also man-
ifested in the State’s ceiling on restitution and reparation.163
The 2001 amendment to the Son of Sam law serves to under-
mine any reasonable consideration of the convicted person’s condi-
tion or ability to pay achieved by restitution/reparation law.  The
funds-of-a-convicted-person provision allows recovery, years after
the incident, without consideration of the impact of payment on a
convicted person’s condition.  By allowing recovery of all assets
once the ten thousand dollar threshold is reached, the law allows




162. “In the event, or when the victim impact statement reports that the victim
seeks restitution or reparation, the court shall require, unless the interests of justice
dictate otherwise . . . that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and
reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss . . . .” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27(1) (McKinney
2002).
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recovery of wages, particularly undermining any interest in the con-
victed person’s well-being or self-sufficiency.  The law also creates a
major disincentive to pursue vindication of rights in court.  The leg-
islature acknowledged this problem and attempted to address it164
by allowing a convicted person to keep ten percent of any money
judgment.165  However, it is hard to imagine that this meager per-
centage is enough to provide meaningful incentive for prisoners to
bring suit for violations of their rights, given the time, resources
and risks involved in litigation.
While the court is forced to consider the interests of the con-
victed person when it awards restitution and reparation, there is no
similar burden on courts acting under the Son of Sam law, even
though the laws address the same circumstances: the ability of vic-
tims of crime to get compensation for their injuries.  While drafted
in the same bundle of bills to complement one another, this incon-
sistency now places the Son of Sam law in direct conflict with the
restitution and reparation law.  In many cases, the consequence of
this conflict is that the Son of Sam law will eviscerate the just impact
achieved under restitution and reparation law.
2. Tort Law
Traditionally, tort law has been the vehicle used by victims to
sue for compensation of losses caused by a tortfeasor’s conduct.
Today, New York tort law exists as a supplement to any restitution
and/or reparation received by a plaintiff.  The Penal Law section
describing New York’s restitution and reparation rules states, “[a]ny
payment made as restitution or reparation pursuant to this section
shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any
civil action or proceeding for an amount in excess of such pay-
ment.”166  The Son of Sam law re-opens the traditional tort statute
of limitations, and by doing so directly conflicts with New York’s
tort law.
164. Memorandum from George Pataki Governor (June 25, 2002), Governor’s Bill
Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 7.  This disincentive to litigate will be discussed further in Sec-
tion IV.C.
165. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 2002).
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a. Statutes of Limitations: Traditional Tort v. Son of
Sam Law
The statute of limitations in New York State for torts is short.  A
plaintiff has one year to bring suit for assault, battery or false impris-
onment167 and two years for wrongful death.168  However, the legis-
lature has recognized the particular difficulties faced by crime
victims who also suffer monetary injury.  First of all, the harm in
such cases is often more severe than the harm caused by non-crimi-
nal tortious conduct.  In addition, where a tortfeasor is sentenced
to prison, recovering money may be made more difficult because of
his or her lack of income.  In reaction to these additional barriers
to recovery, the legislature has passed a number of provisions to aid
crime victims in tort recovery.
In 1992, along with the passage of the renewed Son of Sam law,
New York established a special tort liability scheme for victims of
crime.  New York Civil Procedure Laws and Rules provides for a
statute of limitations of seven years from the date of the crime for
the victim to bring a civil action.169  In 2001, the legislature
amended this law to provide a ten-year statute of limitations for civil
actions arising from certain enumerated violent crimes.170  In addi-
tion, the Estates, Powers and Trust Law provides that where a crimi-
nal prosecution has been brought against a person who committed
the tort of wrongful death, the victim’s representative has at least
one year from the termination of the criminal case to bring suit in
tort.171
In 1992 and again in 2001, New York recognized the special
need of victims for an extended period to bring tort actions against
tortfeasors.  On two separate occasions, the legislature provided for
an extended statute of limitations, recognizing the particular diffi-
culties facing crime victims who seek civil compensation for their
injuries.  The purposes of these laws was clearly to facilitate com-
pensation, distinct from the purpose stated for the Son of Sam law,
which was to prohibit criminals from profiting from their crimes.172
167. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215 (McKinney 2002).
168. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1(1) (McKinney 2003).
169. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-b(1) (McKinney 2002).
170. Id. § 213-b(2), amended by L. 2001, c. 62 § 16, eff. June 25, 2001.
171. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1(2) (McKinney 2003).
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Yet, the tort laws still impose a statute of limitations, recognizing
myriad reasons why the State encourages people to bring suits
against tortfeasors – even those who also face criminal liability – in
a reasonably timely manner.173
In direct conflict with the statute of limitations provisions in
the tort laws, the Son of Sam law operates to expand the statute of
limitations for commencement of a tort action against a person
convicted of a felony.  Under the profits-from-a-crime provision,
any time the convicted person receives profits from a crime, the tort
statute of limitations is reopened for a period of three years.174
Similarly, the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision provides that
any time a person convicted of an enumerated felony amasses assets
totaling ten thousand dollars or more while under the watch of the
criminal justice system,175 the tort statute of limitations is
reopened.176
While both provisions of the law reopen the statute of limita-
tions, in fact, the profits-from-a-crime provision is the more expan-
sive of the two because it applies to all people convicted of felonies
for their entire lives.  Anytime someone receives a profit from a
crime, the statute of limitations is reopened.177  However, the
funds-of-a-convicted-person provision raises far more practical
problems because, i) people are less likely to come into profits from
a crime years after the crime is committed, and ii) people have con-
trol over when they receive profits from a crime.  The funds-of-a-
convicted-person provision links liability to the receipt of money
from almost any source, meaning there is little one can do to avoid
liability even years after the crime.  Furthermore, the liability trig-
ger under the profits-from-a-crime provision is linked to the under-
lying crime.  Under the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision, the
liability is reopened for reasons having nothing to do with the
crime.  Hence, in addition to the practical differences, there is a
philosophical difference between the two provisions.  Because the
funds-of-a-convicted-person provision is more likely to allow recov-
ery significantly after the traditional tort period, the following sub-
173. Rationales for statutes of limitations will be discussed in the next subsection.
174. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney 2002).
175. Id. § 632-a(1)(c) (defining “funds-of-a-convicted-person”).






      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 49 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 42 16-APR-04 14:00
474 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
section addresses the particular problems of expanding the statute
of limitations based on the funds-of-a-convicted person provision,
though many of the critiques apply to both provisions of the law.
b. Problems with Expanding the Statute of Limitations
In order to fully understand the impact of the Son of Sam law,
one must consider the rationales for the statute of limitations in
tort and whether it makes sense to abandon them when a tort was
committed during the course of a particular felony.  While the stat-
ute of limitations for crime-based torts has been expanded in re-
cent years, there are still clear limits within which plaintiffs must
bring suit.  The Son of Sam law appears to eviscerate these limits. It
is possible to defend the Son of Sam law’s extension of the statute
of limitations by arguing that the law does not provide any tools not
already at the disposal of the victim.  Assuming that the victim
brought a civil action in the allotted time frame, all of the convicted
person’s assets would be available for satisfaction of that judgment
for up to twenty years from the date of its issuance.178  So in some
instances, the Son of Sam law does not allow for recovery different
from what would have been allowed if the plaintiff had brought suit
during the initial tort period.179  Yet, it is critical to note that even
the collection of existing judgments is limited to a twenty-year pe-
riod because of the State’s interest in finality.180  This expansion, or
abandonment, of the statute of limitations poses practical problems
with respect to the incentives it provides, as well as problems related
to undermining the fairness and timeliness rationales for time lim-
its in litigation, all of which will be discussed below.
178. “A money judgment is presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration
of twenty years from the time when the party recovering it was first entitled to enforce
it. . ..” N.Y. CPLR § 211 (McKinney 2002).
179. This is the case where the Son of Sam law allows recovery after the tort statute
of limitations has run but before twenty years have passed.
180. See, e.g., In re Application of New York University, 63 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (3d
Dept. 1946) (explaining that limit on enforceability of judgments was designed “like
any Statute of Limitations . . . to bring about a given end to stale claims, and procedural
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i. Practical Problems
Going far beyond the limits of the tort laws and the civil judg-
ment law, the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision creates a never-
ending liability period.  As long as a person is under the watch of
the criminal justice system, he or she is never safe from liability.
For people who have lifetime probation, this law will make their
assets vulnerable until the civil judgment is satisfied, which could
take the rest of their lives.181  Unlike the average tortfeasor, people
convicted of crimes who fall under this provision are not afforded
the protection of a limited number of years within which a plaintiff
must bring suit or a twenty-year expiration of a civil judgment.
Lifetime probation is available for a wide variety of drug re-
lated crimes.182  Therefore, there are likely to be many people in
this category.  While it may be that many of these drug crimes are
victimless, there is nothing in the statute that suggests that the vic-
tim must be associated with the crime for which the convicted per-
son is on probation.  The statute states, “any crime victim shall have
the right to bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction
to recover money damages from a person convicted of a crime of
which the crime victim is a victim.”183  For instance, assume a per-
son commits an assault, goes to prison and then is released.  Years
pass and that person commits a drug offense for which he receives a
sentence of lifetime probation.  Under the funds-of-a-convicted-per-
son provision of the Son of Sam law, the assault victim could sue
him in tort at any time for the rest of his life – even though the
crime for which he is on probation is not the crime that produced
the victim.
181. In New York, someone may be sentenced to lifetime probation for commission
of a Class A-II or Class B felony involving controlled substances. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.06(5) (McKinney 2003).  Class A-II felonies involving a controlled substance in-
clude, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 220.41) (McKinney 2003); criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second
degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18) (McKinney 2003). Class B felonies involving a con-
trolled substance include, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16) (McKinney 2003); criminal sale of a controlled sub-
stance in or near school grounds (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.44) (McKinney 2003); criminal
sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.39) (McKin-
ney 2003).
182. See listed offenses infra note 190.





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 50 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 44 16-APR-04 14:00
476 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
In addition to people on lifetime probation, there are many
people on probation for varying amounts of time who will also be
impacted unfairly by this law.  The effect of the never-ending threat
of liability is quite severe.  It is possible that this extreme penalty
will have the consequence of discouraging people from produc-
tively reengaging in society.  By providing such a major disincentive
to the collection of assets,184 rehabilitation of people involved in
the criminal justice system might be severely hampered.  If the law
allowed recovery of assets for a period of time that eventually en-
ded, like a regular tort statute, the detrimental deterrent effects
would not be as severe.  Similarly, the profits-from-a-crime provision
does not have the same deterrent implications because the receipt
of profits of a crime is much easier for a convicted person to con-
trol and predict.  The problem posed by the funds-of-a-convicted-
person provision is exacerbated by the fact that this extremely
broad liability is so unpredictable.  There is little one can do to pro-
tect him or herself from the application of this provision, seeing
that such a broad range of assets can trigger the law.
ii. Problems of Delay
In addition to the practical problems raised by the law, the dis-
posal of the traditional notion of the statute of limitations in this
context poses philosophical problems as well.  Statutes of limita-
tions foster the values of finality and ripeness in our legal system.
As the Supreme Court has explained, statutes of limitations
represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate
and their underlying rationale is ‘to encourage prompt-
ness in the bringing of actions, that the parties shall not
suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappearance of
witnesses, destruction of documents, or failure of mem-
ory,’ Such statutes ‘are founded upon the general experi-
ence of mankind that claims, which are valid, are not
usually allowed to remain neglected,’ they  ‘promote jus-
tice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
184. Earned income is excluded from the calculation of the ten thousand dollars
necessary to trigger the law.  However, once the law is triggered, all assets are available
to the plaintiff in a civil action.  The problems raised by this particular provision of the
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been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared,’ and they ‘are primarily designed to assure fair-
ness to defendants’ (C)ourts ought to be relieved of the
burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on
his rights.’185
Obviously, the tort claims allowed by the Son of Sam law differ from
the average tort claim in some meaningful ways.  Under the Son of
Sam law, damages are litigated, but liability is established based on
the underlying criminal conviction.  This fact makes some of the
strong arguments made by the Court about the harm caused by de-
lay of litigation weaker in this context.  However, even under the
Son of Sam law, the harms of delay are still relevant because of the
difficulty they pose for litigation of damages.  As the law stands, a
convicted felon might be forced to litigate damages years after the
injury at issue occurred, implicating all of the unreliability
problems resulting from delay discussed above.
iii. Problems of Fairness
In addition to the reliability rationale, the New York State legis-
lature itself recognizes there are other bases for supporting statutes
of limitations because, in cases where liability has been litigated,
they have set a limit on the collection of judgments.186  When an
action is brought to collect a judgment arising from a case that has
already been litigated, it is hard to see how the lapse of time causes
any practical problems inhibiting a plaintiff’s ability to recover.  Yet,
the State has chosen to impose a statute of limitations.  This sug-
gests that New York recognizes justifications, other than the
problems posed by delay, for applying a statute of limitations.
In addition to avoiding the logistical problems of litigating
stale claims, statutes of limitations also function as a protection for
defendants.  As New York Jurisprudence states, “fairness to the de-
fendant is the primary purpose, based on the recognition that a
defendant should be secure in his or her reasonable expectation
that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations. . ..”187
These values are undermined by the Son of Sam law’s never-ending
185. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 327 n.14 (1971) (citations omitted).
186. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 211 (McKinney 2002).
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threat of liability for certain felons under the watch of the criminal
justice system.  Under the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision,
the convicted person is forced to live life with the fear of potentially
devastating monetary liability hanging over his or her head for as
long as he or she is under the watch of the criminal justice system.
The threat of liability posed by the funds-of-a-convicted-person
provision is fundamentally unfair.  The money that triggers the law
is unrelated to the crime.  The extent of the victim’s damages has
no bearing on whether or not the law is applicable.  This means
that someone with minimal damages from a minor assault may be
allowed to bring suit fifteen years after the tort because the
tortfeasor happens to have been successfully prosecuted, whereas a
victim with significant damages from a car crash is not able to col-
lect three years after the tort because the tortfeasor was not prose-
cuted.  The law allows some victims to recover for years longer than
others and subjects some tortfeasors to liability for years longer
than others, with no consideration of the nature of tortious act,
damages, or situations of the involved parties.  By arbitrarily ex-
panding the statute of limitations in this way, New York has under-
mined the interest in fairness achieved by the reasonable repose
normally achieved by the application of a statute of limitations.
While the legislature is empowered to replace the value of fi-
nality with others that it deems more pressing when crime victims
seek compensation, given the internal inconsistencies of New
York’s laws, it is not at all clear that it has consciously chosen to do
so.  In fact, the value of finality is still strongly represented in the
clear limits found in other laws that directly address the ability of
crime victim’s to win compensation.188  Not only is the Son of Sam
law in direct conflict with other New York laws intended to address
victim compensation, it also abandons the important values
achieved by the existence of a statute of limitations, including fair-
ness to defendants, timeliness of litigation and encouraging defen-
dants to participate meaningfully in society without fear of never-
ending liability.  The incongruity between the Son of Sam law and
the rest of New York’s victim compensation scheme reveals the
weaknesses of the system and provides strong ammunition for an
attack on the current law.
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C. Problems Caused by Expansion of Recovery Under 2001 Law
In addition to the conflicts with tort and restitution law dis-
cussed above, another problematic aspect of the Son of Sam law is
the expansion of recovery allowed under the 2001 amendment.
Distinct from the question of what money triggers the Son of Sam
law, here I will consider what money is available to a victim suing
under the Son of Sam law.  Under the 2001 amendment, once a
victim brings suit pursuant to the Son of Sam law, he or she may
recover from all of the convicted person’s assets.  This is a marked
departure from the earlier version of the law that limited recovery
to the assets targeted by the statute, the profits of the crime.  This
expanded recovery poses a number of legal and policy problems
that have been referred to above and will be more fully addressed
in this section.
1. Legal Problem Posed by Expanded Recovery
Prior to the 2001 amendment, the Son of Sam law only allowed
recovery from money constituting profits of the crime.189  The lim-
ited recovery allowed under the Son of Sam law was particularly
significant when the traditional tort statute of limitations had run:
when a plaintiff brought suit after the tort statute of limitations had
run, the recovery was limited to the targeted funds rather than all
the convicted person’s assets, which would have been available had
the case been brought under the tort law.  After the 2001 amend-
ment, all of a convicted person’s assets are available to a victim
bringing suit under either provision of the law.190
The Son of Sam law is still only triggered by a certain set of
money.  The renewed three-year statute of limitations is triggered
when (i) a convicted person under the watch of the criminal justice
system amasses assets totaling ten thousand dollars or more from
any source other than earned income or child support;191 or (ii)
when a convicted person receives profits from a crime.192  However,
the legislative history makes plain that a cause of action brought
during this renewed period can be satisfied from any assets held by
189. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3)(McKinney 2002).
190. Id. § 632-a(3).
191. Id. § 632-a(2)(a)(ii).
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the convicted person.193  Under the funds-of-a-convicted-person
provision, earned income and child support are not used to calcu-
late whether the ten thousand dollar threshold has been reached,
however, they and all other assets of the convicted person are availa-
ble to satisfy any judgment resulting from a Son of Sam law action.
Similarly, only profits of a crime can trigger the profits-from-a-crime
provision, but once the provision applies, all assets of the convicted
person are available to satisfy a judgment won by the victim.
When the Son of Sam law was initially passed in 1977, one of
the first cases addressing the constitutionality of the new law held
that it was constitutional because it only authorized in rem proceed-
ings: proceedings against a particular pot of money that the legisla-
ture determined the convicted person did not have a legitimate
right to possess. Barrett v. Wojtowicz194 was the first case to consider
the legal implications of the newly passed Son of Sam law in 1979.
In that case, the plaintiff brought suit for assault, false imprison-
ment and invasion of privacy based on harm suffered during a bank
robbery five years earlier.195  The bank robbery at issue was the basis
for the movie Dog Day Afternoon.196  Wojtowicz, the defendant in the
tort action, pled guilty to the robbery.197  Having sold his rights to
the story for use in the film, Wojtowicz received a payment of
$43,000 in 1977.198  Pursuant to the newly enacted Son of Sam law,
this money was placed in an escrow account.  The plaintiff insti-
tuted a suit pursuant to the Son of Sam law one month after this
payment was made, which was five years and five months after the
commission of the crime.199
The court held that the plaintiff’s action was not barred by the
traditional one-year limitations period for tort actions because of
the Son of Sam law, which provided victims five years from the date
of the establishment of the escrow fund to bring a tort action.200
Next, the court considered the novel question of whether the stat-
193. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
194. 414 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dept. 1979).
195. Id. at 351.
196. Id. at 352.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 353.
199. Id.
200. The statute was amended in 1978 to clear up an ambiguity in the original
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ute’s extended limitations period was constitutional.  The court, in
its discussion of this question, quoted commentary from New York
Practice stating, “[t]he state constitution’s due process clause has
been construed to require all revivor statutes to be demonstrably
reasonable.”201  The court also cited New York case law holding that
“the Legislature may constitutionally revive a personal cause of ac-
tion where the circumstances are exceptional and are such as to
satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not
guilty of any fault if the intention of the Legislature were not effec-
tuated.”202  Hence, in reaching its decision regarding the constitu-
tionality of the Son of Sam law, the court acknowledged limits on
the ability of the legislature to revive otherwise extinguished causes
of action.  The court ultimately held that, despite these limitations,
the Legislature’s actions here were constitutional:
[W]e hold that it was within the Legislature’s prerogative
to expand the limitations period for the commencement
of a civil assault or false imprisonment suit from one year
after the tortious events to five years after the establish-
ment of an escrow account relating to a crime in which
plaintiff was a victim, even though those causes of action
had already been barred, if the recovery is limited solely
to satisfactions out of the escrow account. Indeed it was
the rectification of what would otherwise be a terrible
wrong.203
The court made clear that it read the statute as creating a new
cause of action, distinct from a traditional tort cause of action, with
recovery limited to the listed sources of funds.  However, its holding
with respect to the limited recovery seems to be more than a ques-
tion of statutory interpretation.  The court seems to have held that
broader recovery is not permissible, regardless of what the statute
says:
There is no question here that the one-year limitations of
CPLR 215 barred the traditional in personam actions for
assault and false imprisonment. Accordingly, any judg-
ment that may be recovered by plaintiff should be
201. Id. at 356.
202. Id. at 356 (quoting Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 174 (1950)).
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deemed one in rem and be limited by the court to a re-
covery of the pro rata amount which is found to be paya-
ble to him from the escrow account held by the Crime
Victims Compensation Board for the benefit of all the vic-
tims of the defendant’s crime and such judgment should
not be deemed a judgment in personam against any other
assets of the defendant.204
Unfortunately, the court does not provide any further explanation
of this finding.  Even so, it raises an important question about the
permissible scope of the Son of Sam law’s reach.
In Wojtowicz, the court held that the 1977 Son of Sam law cre-
ated a new cause of action that was closely linked to the preexisting
tort causes of action.205  Along with creating a new cause of action,
the law also created a new statute of limitations and limited recov-
ery to the funds in the escrow account, thereby distinguishing a Son
of Sam law claim from the broad recovery permissible under a tradi-
tional tort claim.  However, the court intimated that the limited re-
covery might be required even if the statute did not require it.  The
court implied that if the Son of Sam law allowed recovery identical
to that available under the tort law, it would be reviving the lapsed
tort cause of action, which might raises due process problems.  The
court discussed the limits placed on revivor statutes by the New
York Constitution, “the state constitution’s due process clause has
been construed to require all revivor statutes to be demonstrably
reasonable.”206  The court then concluded that the legislature
could expand the limitations period here because to not do so
204. Id. at 357. Wotjowicz is repeatedly cited for the proposition that the legislature
has broad authority to amend statutes of limitations as long as the lapse in time has not
vested a party with title to real or personal property.  There is extensive case law on this
point, which relates directly to the question of when a statute of limitations can be
amended and applied retroactively. See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885);
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).  However, I do not believe
that the holding of Wotjowicz can be so easily categorized.  After discussing this rule
about amended statutes of limitations, the court does go on to make the statement this
footnote is citing.  This suggests that there is some limit on the ability of the legislature
to revive a lapsed cause of action.  While the limited discussion of Wotjowicz makes it
difficult to conclude this definitively, I believe that the ambiguity of this language leaves
open a possible means of attacking the 2001 amendment’s expansion of recovery under
the Son of Sam law.
205. Wotjowicz, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
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would be a terrible wrong.  This analysis is confusing because it sug-
gests both that the law creates a wholly new cause of action, but it
also discusses the question of revival statutes and justifies the law by
reference to the standard for legitimate expansion of existing stat-
utes of limitations.  Given the brevity of the opinion, little can be
found in the document to help resolve this confusion.  However,
even if the rationale for the decision is confused, the result is clear.
The court explicitly held the law’s limited in rem recovery constitu-
tional because to bar recovery in this circumstance would be
wrong.207  The court also suggested that there is a state constitu-
tional standard that might limit the legislature’s ability to extend
the statute of limitations in other situations.208
Given the court’s language, and the lack of any subsequent
contradictory case law, Wotjowic brings into question the 2001
amendment’s expansion of recovery to all assets of the convicted
person.  It might provide an alternative State constitutional ground
for challenge to the amended law that has not yet been raised.  The
expansive recovery allowed under the amended law, which lacks the
strong moral claim of the limited profits of the crime recovery
under the 1992 law, might very well exceed the constitutional
bounds discussed in Wotjowicz.  While there is well-established case
law holding that legislatures have broad discretion to amend and
retroactively apply statutes of limitations under the federal constitu-
tion,209 it appears from the language of Wotjowicz that the State
207. Id.
208. Id. at 356-57.
209. It is well established that defendants do not have a right to the protection of a
statute of limitations.  Rather, the statute of limitations is an arbitrary procedural bar
that has no impact on the underlying claim.  The legislature, therefore, has broad dis-
cretion to alter and retroactively impose statutes of limitations without creating any due
process problems for a defendant. See, e.g., Campbell, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).  Courts have
distinguished between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, holding that in the
case of the latter, the running of the statute does extinguish the right at stake.  Hence
the retroactive amendment of a statute of repose does raise due process problems. Gulf
Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633 (1925).  Because of the confusion caused by the repose/
limitations distinction, there is an emerging circuit split in this area.  The rejection of
the Campbell/Danzer analysis is limited so far to the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit,
both of which have replaced it with a rational basis test.  E.g., Wesley Theological Semi-
nary of the United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 876 F.2d 119 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Shadburne-Vinton v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 60 F.3d 1071 (4th Cir.
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Constitution might provide additional due process protections al-
lowing challenges not available under the federal Constitution.
2. Policy Problems Posed by Expanded Recovery
In addition to the legal problems posed by the expansion of
recovery under the 2001 amendment, the expansion is inconsistent
with the stated rationale for the Son of Sam law and raises signifi-
cant policy problems.
Until 2001, the Son of Sam law was intended to prevent con-
victed felons from profiting from their crimes.  Tort law and restitu-
tion law were concerned with victim compensation.  In fact, tort
and restitution laws were amended in 1992 to address the particular
problem of crime victims’ tort claims.210  This issue was addressed
in the tort and restitution laws because the purpose of the Son of
Sam law was distinct – it was an antiprofit law.211
Once again, in 2001 the legislature amended the tort law, the
restitution law, and the Son of Sam law.  But rather than respecting
the long-established and distinct purposes of these laws, the legisla-
ture radically altered the operation of the Son of Sam law.  As of
2001, the Son of Sam law is a harshly punitive tort law – completely
divorced from its anti-profit mooring.  The legislative history docu-
ments that the amendment to the Son of Sam law was passed to
target a particular source of money – civil judgments won by prison-
ers,212 a set of funds unrelated to the commission of the crime.  In
addition to civil judgments, all assets of the convicted person are
now available under the Son of Sam law, representing not only a
massive expansion but also a distinct break from the traditional
purposes of the law.
There is little doubt that the 2001 amendment of New York’s
Son of Sam law was motivated by public outrage at the case of David
McClary.  The record contains many expressions of this sentiment:
“if a criminal gains the ability to pay while he or she is a ward of the
local, State or federal criminal justice system (or acquires a finan-
e.g., Barr v. McGraw- Hill, 1992 WL 196754, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Adler v. Berg Har-
mon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
210. See discussion supra p. 435.
211. See discussion supra p. 436.
212. Act of June 25, 2001, c. 62, 2001 N.Y. LAWS 530 (Consol.), Gm-4 (amending
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cial or proprietary interest while a ward of the system), then the
victim who was injured by the criminal should no longer shoulder
expenses that directly relate to the crime.”213  The legislative history
is filled with strong rhetoric like this supporting the sweeping ex-
pansion of the law.  In many instances, the sentiment reveals the
illogical thinking behind the law.  In a press release supporting the
new Son of Sam law, Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno
commented,
[t]he tragedy and trauma of falling victim to a crime is
only compounded by the knowledge that a criminal can
profit from his deeds while the victim continues to suffer.
The Governor’s common sense proposal ensures that no
victim will suffer the further indignity of seeing his or her
attacker gain an undeserved windfall.214
He refers to the State’s interest in not allowing a criminal to “profit
from his deeds.”  Yet this interest was achieved by the 1992 version
of the law.  Expanding recovery to all assets of the convicted person
does nothing to further this anti-profit interest.  Senator Bruno also
refers to the State’s interest in not allowing a criminal to gain an
“undeserved windfall.”  The civil judgment won by David McClary
in compensation for the harms he suffered while in prison – the
asset that incited the expansion of the law – cannot legitimately be
classified as an undeserved windfall even if one supports the idea of
his victim gaining access to those funds.  Further evidencing the
reactionary sentiment supporting the amendment, the bill’s pri-
mary sponsor, Senator Guy Velella (R-Bronx), stated, “[i]t is foolish
to treat prisoners like they are on vacation.  We should not allow
inmates to make money on their handicrafts.”215  These comments
suggest the legislature’s rejection of the anti-profit rationale was fu-
eled by a rash, emotional response to a highly political circum-
stance.  This apparent lack of forethought explains why the law
poses so many practical problems.
213. Nozzolio Memorandum, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L. 2001, c. 62 at 19.
214. Press Release “Governor George Pataki, Governor Pataki Renews Call to
Strengthen Son of Sam Law” (March 26, 2001), (on file with the New York Law School
Law Review).
215. Joe Mahoney, Measure Forbids Inmates to Pocket Art Sale Profits, DAILY NEWS (New
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While the legislature arguably has the discretion to target peo-
ple under the watch of the criminal justice system this way, it does
so at the expense of New York’s own carefully calibrated system of
civil compensation laws.  As discussed earlier, allowing recovery
outside the traditional tort limitations period makes sense only if
recovery is limited.  To allow broad in personam recovery under-
mines the purposes of the statutes of limitations imposed by various
other provisions of New York law.  Most significantly, the law di-
rectly undermines the purpose and effect of the existing tort law
that imposes a special statute of limitations for victims of crime.
This law cannot be justified by the simple explanation that the legis-
lature has decided that, under these circumstances, no statute of
limitations should exist.  The legislature has passed two laws that
seem to address the exact same circumstance, yet they directly con-
flict.  In addition to this direct conflict, the expanded Son of Sam
law conflicts with the intentions and spirit of restitution law and tort
law in other ways discussed above.216  These conflicts support my
contention that the law is a poorly considered political reaction that
fails to consider the competing significant interests at stake.
Furthermore, the funds-of-a-convicted-person provision creates
never-ending liability for people on lifetime probation and irration-
ally targets people involved in the criminal justice system.  As dis-
cussed above, there is a large population of people in New York that
face the threat of lifetime probation.217  By threatening the assets
accumulated by people on probation and parole, the State is di-
rectly undermining the rehabilitative purposes of probation, parole
and the criminal justice system more generally.  In addition to pos-
ing a continual threat to the accrual of assets, the law targets this
population alone for this harsh sanction.  The law chooses not to
burden non-criminal tortfeasors, or criminal tortfeasors who are
not involved in the criminal justice system, in this way.  While in
Section III.C.3 I discussed the reasons why this unequal treatment is
not likely to be found unconstitutional, it is highly suspect.  The
strength of the equal protection challenge here is key to revealing
the reactionary and illogical nature of this law.
216. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1-2.
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Lastly, the law provides a host of disturbing incentives for pris-
ons and prisoners a like.  The legislative history clearly explains that
the amendment to the law was passed in order to allow victims ac-
cess to civil rights awards won by prisoners while in prison.  This
creates a major disincentive for the vindication of prisoner’s rights.
The diminished threat of legal action, combined with the reality
that any award will go to the prisoner’s victim, in turn minimizes
the disincentives for prison authorities to not violate the rights of
inmates.  As one newspaper article reported, “Critics say the mea-
sures make prisoners little more than slaves and do nothing to reha-
bilitate them.”218  The threat that the law poses to the existing
protections of prisoners’ rights is worrisome – not only from the
perspective of prisoner rights advocates, but for anyone who be-
lieves that the criminal justice system should do more than simply
punish.  This law undermines a number of protections currently
found in other New York laws, yet does so in ad hoc and inconsis-
tent ways that render it arbitrary and excessively punitive.  It is not
at all clear why this particular set of convicted people should be
singled out for this extreme penalty when many other similarly situ-
ated people (non-criminal tortfeasors, criminal tortfeasors no
longer in the system) are not subject to it.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the 1992 version of the Son of Sam law still raised First
Amendment questions.  Perhaps it failed to provide for the com-
pensation of every victim in every instance.  However, the 1992 ver-
sion of the Son of Sam law was a thoughtful solution to a difficult
problem that requires the unemotional consideration of both the
victim’s and the convicted person’s interests.  The 2001 Amend-
ment to the Son of Sam law allowed emotional rhetoric to disturb
the careful balance achieved by the legislature.  Not only is the law
internally inconsistent, as the legislative history reveals, it is incon-
sistent with the intentions of the rest of New York’s compensation
law.  It is also harsher than the laws found in other states.  While
constitutional challenges to the law might face difficulty, the
strength of the legal arguments, combined with evidence of how
218. Michael Gormley, Son of Sam Law Expansion OK’d, TIMES UNION (Albany), June
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out of step the law is with similar laws in other states and with New
York’s own laws, might provide fuel for successful political organiza-
tion and lobbying efforts.  The considerable policy and legal
problems raised by this law may be highlighted and used to en-
courage the legislature to take another look at this complex issue.
